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1. Introduction 
There has been a recent surge in the number of disasters and incidents in occurring in the 
process industry (e.g. the petrochemical, chemical, food and pharmaceutical industries). The 
reasons include defects in process-safety management (PSM); inadequate safety 
management systems in companies; inadequate knowledge among managers and 
insufficient information about the tasks undertaken and resultant erroneous operation 
and/or misjudgement; no standardization for the PSM activity; and other engineering 
factors. Expecting that PSM will reduce the hazards and likelihood of disasters, OSHA in 
USA emphasizes PSM and requires that companies establish PSM systems and improve 
safety engineering techniques (OSHA, 1992). 
Existing PSM guidelines, OSHA/PSM, Seveso II Directive (The Council of the European 
Union, 1996), AIChE/CCPS RBPS (Risk-based Process Safety) (AIChE/CCPS, 2007) and 
others, establish only minimum elements for safety management. They do not describe 
concrete actions to take within facilities. The importance of discussion of process/plant 
engineering activities based on business process modelling throughout a ’plant-lifecycle (i.e. 
from process/plant design through construction and the active manufacturing period (incl. 
production and maintenance))’ has been recognized for many years. Development of a 
systematized PSM framework should prevent disasters and ensure consistency within plant-
lifecycle engineering (Plant-LCE). 
To develop a plant- and site-specific PSM approach, it is important to clarify the relationship 
between management and individual activities, and to consider the technical and functional 
frameworks within the human-organization system. Traditionally, business-process analysis 
has been conducted according to organizational configurations and strives to clarify 
responsibilities (‘know-who’ and ‘know-what’) among employees and managers. However, 
companies have specific organizational frameworks, administrative structures, policies or 
strategies of operations management, and specialized engineering techniques (individual 
methods, procedures, tools, etc.), and therefore the standardization of business processes 
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and the development of generic management frameworks to which companies can refer is 
very difficult. The first thing necessary for practical disaster management is to make hidden 
business knowledge (specifically the ‘know-why’) explicit by focusing on functional and 
logical structures of the business process (i.e. the causal relations and information flow 
among and between business activities). 
This chapter aims to discuss what should be done to business functions (i.e. activities) and 
what should be done to operations at a plant-site. The focus of business process modelling is 
mainly on engineering activities in the process industry. These activities are organized 
hierarchically following a template in the form of the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) cycle. The 
business process model (BPM) of a Plant-LCE (including PSM) is presented as an example. 
2. Plant-lifecycle engineering 
As show in Fig.1, a plant-lifecycle consists of the following engineering stages: development, 
design, construction, production, maintenance, and scrap (or dismantlement). It may be 
more than 40 years from the beginning (or development) stage to the end (or scrap) stage. 
Over its lifetime, the product markets and the costs of raw materials and fuels may vary 
dramatically. During that time, changes of production rules or strategies and/or revamping 
of a plant’s facilities are undertaken. Underlying hazards may be found while technology is 
improved or as a result of accidents that occur in the industry. Furthermore, degraded 
plants should be renovated to meet requirements for safety, because the quality of facilities 
is often diminished during their production tenures. Under these external and internal 
environmental conditions, changes of plant structure, processes, plant design, production 
and maintenance are necessary. For all changes, safety assessments and improvements are 
always needed. Process hazard analysis (PHA) and management of change (MOC) are 
perpetual and vital. Many activities are needed to achieve MOC. Modification of even a 
small part of a plant will affect many other stages in the plant-lifecycle. Stages in a plant-
lifecycle are intricately connected. 
 
Fig. 1. Engineering stages through the plant-lifecycle 
Most disasters occur during the production and maintenance stages of a plant-lifecycle. 
Researches during the development and design stages to improve safety during the 
production and maintenance stages help to prevent disasters. For example, plant equipment 
that is designed with low tolerance for operating conditions is difficult to operate safely and 
may lead to heightened risk, hazard and even disaster. If plant engineers can design for 
wider operating range, equipment is easier to operate safely and may produce few disasters. 
Furthermore, design based upon clear understanding of production and maintenance 
processes (‘design rationale’) can also help to avoid disasters. If the proper design rationale 
(‘know-why’) is incorporated into a facility, poor and dangerous decision making will be 
avoided. For systematic disaster management, a model-based engineering framework is 
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needed so that information can be used to inform all stages of the plant-lifecycle. Constantly 
updated and revised data must be shared at each engineering stage in a transparent way in 
order to examine the impacts of safety decisions of all functions/activities of the plant. Such 
an information infrastructure is not currently available, so we have wasted enormous 
manpower to acquire or update proper information. To realize the engineering framework 
based on the information infrastructure, business activities and information flow among 
them should be represented explicitly. 
3. Basis of business process modelling for plant-LCE 
IDEF0 (Integrated DEfinition for Functional model standard, Type-zero) is adopted as a 
description format to develop the business process model. And a template has been 
proposed to generalize the modelling in IDEF0 format. 
3.1 IDEF0 format 
IDEF0 is a well-known standardized method for enterprise-resource planning or business-
process (re)engineering. Fig. 2 shows the basis of the IDEF0 format. The rectangle represents 
an ‘activity (function)’, and the arrows describe information. The information is classified into 
four categories: 'Input' which is changed by the activity, 'Control' which constrains the 
activity, 'Output' which is the result of the activity and 'Mechanism' includes the resources of 
the activity. The information is collectively termed ICOM (Input, Control, Output, and 
Mechanism). Each activity can be further developed hierarchically to detail sub-activities as 
needed (NIST, 1993). Development of business process model using the IDEF0 format 
enables function-based discussions. 
  
Fig. 2. Basis of IDEF0 format 
3.2 Template for developing business process model 
The PIEBASE (Process Industry Executive for achieving Business Advantage using 
Standards for data Exchange) was an international consortium to achieve a common 
strategy and vision for the delivery and use of internationally accepted standards for 
information sharing and exchange (ISO-STEP), and developed a business process model to 
represent the core business activity of the chemical process industry (PIEBASE, 1998). The 
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PIEBASE model uses a template approach across all principal activities. This template 
consists of three steps, (1) manage, (2) do, and (3) provide resources. The purpose of 
PIEBASE model is to provide a common understanding of the engineering and information 
requirements of processes throughout the lifecycle of a plant. However, the activities in the 
model were defined to reflect current practices. 
On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 3, a template for business process modelling (BPM-
template) of Plant-LCE has been proposed to generalize the modelling in IDEF0 format and 
enable a discussion of integrating each business process model for Plant-LCE (Shimada et 
al., 2009). This BPM-template consists of two functions; ‘Performance in the form of a PDCA 
(Plan-Do-Check-Act) cycle’ and ‘Resource provision’. 
 
Fig. 3. BPM-template for business process modelling 
1. Performance in the form of PDCA cycle (Deming, 2000): Each activity should be carried 
out according to engineering standards (or ESs; e.g. technical standards and control 
standards) complying with laws and regulations. 
- The ‘Manage’ activity manages the progress of overall activities within the same plane, 
including the requirement of resource provision, the improvement of engineering 
standard, and decision making of the next action for change requirement. 
- The purpose of the ‘Plan’ activity is to make an executable plan for a given specific 
directive. 
- The ‘Do’ activity executes a plan and yields requirements for administrative defect 
factors, if any. 
- The ‘Check’ activity evaluates the results and the performance of the previous activities 
to support these goals: a) performance and results for the directive and the plan, b) 
compliance with engineering standard, c) sufficient provision of resources, and d) 
validity of engineering standard itself. 
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2. Resource provision: ‘Provide resources’ activity provides the resources to support and 
control ‘Plan’, ‘Do’, ‘Check’, and ‘Act’ activities. These resources include: a) educated and 
trained people and organizations; b) facilities and equipment, tools, and methods for 
supporting activities; c) information to perform PDC activities; d) information for 
progress management; and e) engineering standard for controlling each activity, which 
are given from the activity of upper plane. 
This BPM-template enables development of business process model to perform activity 
planning, execution, evaluation, and improvement at each sub-activity plane. That is, the 
model based on proposed BPM-template shows the implementation in the form of PDCA 
cycle and the uniform management of engineering standard with provision of just enough 
resources. And the developed model can make the purpose, the contents, and the relevant 
ICOM of individual activity clear. 
Features of the business process model are: 
• Business process activities with information and information flows at each stage of the 
plant-lifecycle are modelled in the form of PDCA cycle. The scope of each management 
plan becomes clear. The decision making, evaluation processes, resources, information, 
and engineering standard required for performing each process are expressed explicitly. 
• All information needed to perform each activity (including the plans, the performance 
results and checked results) are collected, managed, and in the ‘provide resource’ step in 
the framework. The ‘Provide resources’ activity is to achieve consistency between 
engineering standards. 
• Business processes are structured as activities or functions that are logically required 
regardless of a company’s organization. 
• Using the business process model as reference model should expose problems with the 
current process, activities that are not performed in the PDCA cycle, and any defects 
during information sharing and communication. The countermeasures of the problems, 
consolidation of technical requirements, and the processes centered on organization 
integration can be reviewed. 
4. Business process modelling for disaster management 
Business process model should be seen as a ‘to-be’ model that represents the logical business 
process. The following points are required for a referenceable model. 
• The definitions of business functions and the scope of them must be clarified before 
starting the development of model. 
• Activities that develop technologies and activities that use technologies for engineering 
functions should be clearly distinguished. 
• Activities must be categorized as ‘Plan’, ‘Do’, ‘Check (Evaluate)’, or ‘Manage (Act)’ 
activities in order to develop a model that constitutes an activity framework in the form 
of a PDCA cycle.  
Furthermore, two points must be kept in mind so as not to create a business process model 
that only represents a specific company’s activities. 
• The model should be considered separate from the company by assigning tasks based 
upon on organizational structure not specific workers in the specific company. That is, 
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tasks should not be based on the question of “who should do them?”, but rather on 
“what has to be done?” 
• Specific activities in an individual company should not be the focus of the model. 
Widely-used and generalized structures of activities and information flow related to the 
activities should be developed. 
Activities that are performed at actual companies (plant engineering companies, plant 
operation companies, etc.) have been compiled and examined, and business process models 
have been developed based on the BPM-template displayed in Section 3. Fig. 4 shows a 
business process model reflecting the activities of Plant-LCE. ‘Do’ activities of this model are 
comprised of activities of development and design, construction, and manufacturing stages. 
Models for process and plant design, production, maintenance within manufacturing, and 
PSM are described in the following sections. 
 
Fig. 4. Top activities of business process model of plant-LCE 
4.1 Business process model for process and plant design 
Chemical processes generate potential hazards, and these processes are designed to avoid 
hazards given that they can evolve into serious events. In general, the risk is controlled within 
a region of safety within normal operations. However, some initiating events that exceed the 
control capabilities of normal operations can cause abnormal deviations and hazardous events 
that can lead to human and physical damages. The purpose of using independent protection 
layers (IPLs) (AIChE/CCPS, 2001) is to prevent the occurrence of hazardous events by 
designing protective systems against failure sequences that might lead to disasters. Table 1 
shows the most commonly encountered IPLs that should be considered for inclusion during 
www.intechopen.com
 
Disaster Management Based on Business Process Model Through the Plant Lifecycle 
 
25 
process and plant design. In a typical plant engineering project, the analysis that precedes the 
IPL design and the IPL design itself are not incorporated in a systematic way with the process 
and plant design. This is related to the common lack of design rationales in the design of safety 
systems, and these result in alarm floods (ISA, 2007). To overcome these problems, a business 
process model is developed to provide a framework for process and plant design. 
IPL No. Countermeasures
1 Inherently safer process design
2 Basic process control system, process alarm and operator supervision 
3 Critical alarms, operator supervision, and manual intervention
4 Automatic Safety Interlock System (SIS)
5 Physical protection (relief devices)
6 Physical protection (containment dikes)
7 Facility emergency response
8 Community emergency response
Table 1. Independent protection layers 
A business process model for process and plant design that incorporates IPL design has 
been developed (Fuchino et al., 2011). This model is based on the previously discussed BPM-
template across all principal activities, and the Plant-LCE approach was adopted as well. 
Fig. 5 shows a part of the node tree from "(A3) Perform Process and Plant Design" of business 
process model of the Plant-LCE. The process design activity consists of three phases: 
conceptual, preliminary, and final. The plant design is composed of two phases: preliminary 
and final. The conceptual process design phase (A33) corresponds to the inherently safer 
process design in IPL (1), including hazard elimination and substitution, inventory 
considerations, and plant location. The preliminary process design phase (A34) is related to 
the design of IPLs (2) to (6). In "(A34) Develop Preliminary Process Design (IPL-2_6)", the 
process design according to operational requirements of normal, abnormal, and emergency 
operations is executed. In designing process for normal steady state operation (A343), basic 
process control system is designed, so that the safety operating ranges should be assessed in 
A3432 activity before A3433 activity. “(A344) Develop Preliminary Process Design for Startup 
(S/U) and Shutdown (S/D) operation” evaluates the current plant design to verify that all the 
necessary equipment is available to perform startup and shutdown. As a result preliminary 
operating procedures are obtained along with information on operating limits and time-
related data that can be used to configure state-based alarm algorithms. The synthesis of 
startup and shutdown operations takes place in A3442 activity. To specify initial conditions 
and safety constraints in A34423 activity, the hazardous conditions should be assessed in 
A34422 activity. In "(A345) Develop Preliminary Process Design for Abnormal Situation" activity, 
PHA is necessary (A34522) and the operation category (fallback, partial shutdown, or total 
shutdown) is determined. This is because hazard analysis is used to identify possible hazard 
scenarios and its recommendations for additional sensors, alarms or other IPLs, some of which 
are addressed in activity A34523. Furthermore, because hazard scenarios contain information 
about causes, consequences, and corrective actions, they can also be used justify the design 
rationale for a given alarm. Operational responsibility should be estimated in A34523 activity, 
and the operation category is decided in A34524 activity. The activities to perform PHA are 
depicted in Fig. 5. It is clear that PHA and IPL design should be performed concurrently to 
generate rationalized process safety design. This makes it possible to manage the information 
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on design rationale which can be useful for safety production management and effective 
maintenance and contributes to disaster prevention in process industry. 
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Fig. 5. Node tree from “(A3) perform process and plant design” 
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4.2 Business process model for production 
It is essential to create the environment that can support purposeful management of safe 
operation and effective maintenance while performing normal manufacturing activities. The 
activities related to production and maintenance in the Plant-LCE are unified as 
manufacturing with production planning. This enables development of an integrated plan 
to manage production and maintenance activities together. 
It is difficult to develop a unified business process model for manufacturing due to the 
differences with aspects of production management because of the organization of 
individual companies and the differences of operation philosophies of each type of plant 
(for instance, petroleum refineries compared to petrochemical plants and fine chemical 
plants). For these reasons, there have been no attempts to develop a business process model 
for production activities. To surmount this challenge, the following two principles have 
been established before starting the analysis of production: 1) The model is independent of 
organizational frameworks in specific companies, and 2) Specific production activities in 
specific companies will not be considered and only general activities and only the flow of 
information should be considered. Specific activities can be added to the BPM-template for 
use by specific companies to apply the model to real-world cases. 
Business process model have been developed for production (Shimada et al., 2010a). 
Activities under “(A53) Perform Production”, which is a sub-activity of “(A5) Perform 
Manufacturing”, have been considered targets of business process modelling for production. 
At first, activities of production that are performed routinely at some companies have been 
listed and extracted by reference to international standard (IEC, 2003). Then, the activities 
and their relations have been generalized according to the BPM-template. Fig. 6 shows the 
node tree from “(A53) Perform Production” which consists of production scheduling, 
inventory control, and production execution. “(A534) Execute Production” activity consists of 
dispatching operations, preparation for operations, and execution of operations. Operation 
is comprised of operation for both normal and emergency situations, and normal operation 
has three main activities: operation-case execution, monitoring and diagnosis from the 
viewpoints of SQEA (Safety, Quality, Environment, and Availability), and construction support 
under plant operation. As a second step, ICOM on production management is provided to 
for relation to production. As information related to mechanism, people, facilities and 
equipment, information, consistent engineering standards, etc. needed for performing 
production are clearly specified and managed in an integrated manner. 
Fig. 7 shows the business process model for “(A5344) Execute Operation” as a part of 
production. The model shown in Fig. 7 do not mention about ‘Plan’ activity explicitly, but 
directives from upper level activity that is “Decided operating procedures” and “Directive of 
normal operation” include each concrete execution plan. 
The meanings of terms in the business process model and concrete examples of activities 
have been written down in the glossary, which is separate from the model. This glossary can 
help assist discussion of the model by clarifying what, how, and why steps are taken within 
the model specifically. At the same time, resources needed for executing each activity are 
also listed. 
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Fig. 6. Node tree from “(A53) perform production” 
 
Fig. 7. Business process model for “(A5344) Execute Operation” 
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Developing a business process model for production provides following advantages: 
• Development makes it possible to summarize the activities hierarchically and to clarify 
the required inputs, the constraining conditions, and the resources needed for each 
activity. 
• Scope of safety operation management can be specified by extracting the structured 
activities of production. 
• Performing production according to the developed model makes it possible to convey 
process-safety information positively and to enable the prevention of industrial 
accidents or disasters due to PSM difficulties. 
• Introduction of a framework given as a model provides the basis of safety conscious 
production for the process industry. 
4.3 Business process model for maintenance 
Chemical plants employ a lot of flammable materials as raw materials, intermediates and 
products, so leakage is a serious problem that may lead to fire, explosion and/or disaster. 
Chemical plants are deteriorated by their production, and maintenance aims to restore the 
deteriorated plant into a safe condition. The mechanism, speed, and location of the 
deterioration vary with operating conditions (e.g. increasing flow rate in pipes sometimes 
change the location of sludge deposition, and the mechanisms of corrosion under the 
sludge). However, the deterioration (especially corrosion) is much more complicated by the 
chemical compounds and flows of process fluid, the plant structure (including the nature of 
the materials used in its construction), and electrochemical behavior. Therefore, the exact 
deteriorating location and level of deterioration (and/or residual life of the deteriorating 
part) cannot be expected from the beginning but can only identify the probabilities of 
deterioration locations. 
In order to perform maintenance consistent with production and plant state through the 
plant-lifecycle, a mechanism not only to integrate the information of lifecycle activities 
(design, production and maintenance), but also to systematize the results of maintenance 
into technology is needed. Business process model have been developed for maintenance in 
order to define the framework of the processes (Fuchino et al., 2008, 2010). Fig. 8 shows the 
node tree from “(A54) Maintain Plant” of business process model of the plant-LCE. The 
model is based on the preceding BPM-template across all principal activities, and the Plant-
LCE approach was adopted. 
“(A54) Maintain Plant” activity receives directives and requirements for maintenance from 
“(A51) Manage Manufacturing”. The information from the production plan comes from 
“(A52) Make Production Plan” and any other information for maintenance including 
operational results and maintenance results is from “(A56) Provide Resources for 
Manufacturing”. Furthermore, engineering standard necessary to perform maintenance is 
delivered from A56 to A54 activities. A54 activity developed into “(A541) Manage 
Maintenance”, “(A542) Make Maintenance Plan”, “(A543) Perform Maintenance”, “(A544) 
Evaluate Maintenance Plan and Performance” and “(A545) Provide Resources for Maintenance”. 
A541 activity decides sub-directives for A542 to A544 activities on the basis of the directive, 
requirement and production plan from the upper hierarchical activities, and A542 to A544 
activities are performed under the constraint of the sub-directives. The A545 receives 
information and engineering standard for maintenance, and the information is delivered 
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 to A542 to A544 activities. Making a maintenance plan is defined as deciding which parts 
and at what times to repair the plant, as well as selecting methods for inspection and repair.  
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㻭㻡㻠㻟㻝㻦 㻹㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑 㻹㼍㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼍㼚㼏㼑 㻱㼤㼑㼏㼡㼠㼕㼛㼚
㻭㻡㻠㻟㻟㻝㻦 㻿㼡㼜㼑㼞㼢㼕㼟㼑 㻹㼍㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼍㼚㼏㼑
㻭㻡㻠㻡㻦 㻼㼞㼛㼢㼕㼐㼑 㻾㼑㼟㼛㼡㼞㼏㼑㼟 㼒㼛㼞 㻹㼍㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼍㼚㼏㼑
㻭㻡㻠㻠㻦 㻱㼢㼍㼘㼡㼍㼠㼑 㻹㼍㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼍㼚㼏㼑 㻼㼘㼍㼚 㼍㼚㼐 㻼㼑㼞㼒㼛㼞㼙㼍㼚㼏㼑
㻭㻡㻠㻟㻟㻡㻦 㻼㼞㼛㼢㼕㼐㼑 㻾㼑㼟㼛㼡㼞㼏㼑㼟 㼒㼛㼞 㻵㼚㼟㼜㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚 㼍㼚㼐 㻾㼑㼜㼍㼕㼞
㻭㻡㻠㻟㻟㻠㻦 㻭㼡㼐㼕㼠 㻵㼚㼟㼜㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚 㼍㼚㼐 㻾㼑㼜㼍㼕㼞
㻭㻡㻠㻟㻟㻟㻦 㻼㼑㼞㼒㼛㼞㼙 㻾㼑㼜㼍㼕㼞
㻭㻡㻠㻟㻠㻦 㻱㼢㼍㼘㼡㼍㼠㼑 㻹㼍㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼍㼚㼏㼑 㻱㼤㼑㼏㼡㼠㼕㼛㼚 㻼㼘㼍㼚 㼍㼚㼐 㻱㼤㼑㼏㼡㼠㼕㼛㼚
㻭㻡㻠㻟㻡㻦 㻼㼞㼛㼢㼕㼐㼑 㻾㼑㼟㼛㼡㼞㼏㼑㼟 㼒㼛㼞 㻹㼍㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼍㼚㼏㼑 㻱㼤㼑㼏㼡㼠㼕㼛㼚
㻭㻡㻠㻞㻝㻦 㻹㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑 㻹㼍㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼍㼚㼏㼑 㻼㼘㼍㼚
㻭㻡㻟㻦 㻼㼑㼞㼒㼛㼞㼙 㻼㼞㼛㼐㼡㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚
㻭㻡㻞㻦 㻹㼍㼗㼑 㻼㼞㼛㼐㼡㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚 㻼㼘㼍㼚
㻭㻡㻝㻦 㻹㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑 㻹㼍㼚㼡㼒㼍㼏㼠㼡㼞㼕㼚㼓
㻭㻡㻦 㻼㼑㼞㼒㼛㼞㼙 㻹㼍㼚㼡㼒㼍㼏㼠㼡㼞㼕㼚㼓
㻭㻡㻡㻦 㻱㼢㼍㼘㼡㼍㼠㼑 㻹㼍㼚㼡㼒㼍㼏㼠㼡㼞㼕㼚㼓
㻭㻡㻢㻦 㻼㼞㼛㼢㼕㼐㼑 㻾㼑㼟㼛㼡㼞㼏㼑㼟 㼒㼛㼞 㻹㼍㼚㼡㼒㼍㼏㼠㼡㼞㼕㼚㼓
 
Fig. 8. Node tree from “(A54) maintain plant” 
The A5422 activity determines the part repaired and timing using the information from the 
production plan, production results and maintenance results. Repair and timing guide 
inspection and methods of repair from the inspection and repair data base in A5423 activity. 
The results of such maintenance planning inform “(A543) Perform Maintenance” via A5425 
and A5421 activities. To perform maintenance, maintenance procedure is planned in A54322 
activity which is a sub-activity of “(A5432) Make Maintenance Execution Plan”, and inspection 
and repair are carried out in A54332 and A54333 activities of “(A5433) Execute Maintenance”. 
The results of the maintenance execution plan, inspection and repair are stored in “(A5435) 
Provide Resources for Maintenance Execution” together with the result of maintenance 
execution plan. The stored information is transferred to “(A7) Provide Resources for 
Performing Plant-LCE” activity via activities that are compartmentalized in ‘Provide 
resources’ on several hierarchical nodes. The results of maintenance are group into 
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technology and engineering standard in A7 activity, and are reflected in activities at every 
hierarchical node. When some defects of technology and/or engineering standard are 
found, changes are required in upper hierarchical nodes. These changes are decided in the 
activities categorized as ‘Manage’ on several hierarchical nodes. Therefore, the PDCA cycle 
within and across the hierarchy can be configured, and a to-be model for maintenance can be 
developed. 
Fig.9 shows the business process model for “(A54) Maintain Plant”. The output information 
from ‘Plan’, ‘Do’ and ‘Check’ activities is standardized into “Requirement of resources and 
engineering standards”, “Change Request”, “Progress” and “Certified Output”, and is consistent 
within the hierarchies. This model can specify the system requirements for development of 
an environment to support knowledge management for maintenance. 
 
Fig. 9. Business process model for “(A54) maintain plant” 
4.4 Business process model for PSM 
4.4.1 Importance of systematic PSM 
PSM is a management system that is focused on prevention of, preparedness for, 
mitigation of, response to, and restoration from catastrophic releases of chemicals or 
energy from a process plant. The main purpose of PSM is to maintain the safety of a 
production plant, and it could be realized by the Plant-LCE as shown in Fig. 10 (Shimada 
et al., 2010b). Plant development stage includes the periods of research and development 
(R&D), design, and construction of the facility. The manufacturing stage includes 
production and maintenance. PSM activities at the design stage are intended to design a 
safe process plant. Safe facilities are constructed through PSM activities during the 
construction stage. PSM activities at the maintenance stage are intended to maintain the 
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integrity of the functioning of facilities throughout production. Furthermore, it is 
important to perform PSM activity in the form of a PDCA cycle, steps such as planning 
safety countermeasure based on risk assessments, execution of plans, evaluation of 
outputs and the sharing of process-safety information though the plant-lifecycle. And for 
the MOC, one of functions in the PSM system, it is also important to make decisions to 
respond to change by ensuring consistency among activities. 
 
Fig. 10. PSM with plant-LCE 
4.4.2 Business process model for PSM with Plant-LCE 
Business process model have been developed for PSM. Fig. 11 shows an overview of PSM 
activities with Plant-LCE. A basic plan for PSM is considered based on a corporation’s 
philosophy as PSM activity at the enterprise-level and PSM activities at the plant-site-level 
are performed to develop this basic plan. Activities at each level structure the PDCA cycle 
which clearly specifies planning, execution, evaluation, and improvement. ‘Provide resources’ 
activities are added to clarify the resources needed and to define the environmental 
conditions it requires. 
The business process model for PSM has been developed by extracting the essential 
activities and ICOM for maintaining process safety of production plant through the plant-
lifecycle. Fig. 12 shows top activities of business process model for PSM. This model 
makes relationships among PSM activities clear. Aside from this model, the glossary and 
the list of typical tasks of PSM activities are summarized to help a user understand the 
model for PSM in a tabular form. In this table, resources such as process-safety 
information and engineering standard needed for accomplishing PSM activities are 
clearly specified. It becomes possible to understand the meanings and the contents of the 
activities and the information described in the model. And information sharing on PSM 
through the Plant-LCE can be achieved. 
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Fig. 11. Overview of PSM activities with plant-LCE 
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Fig. 12. Top activities of business process model for PSM with plant-LCE 
Furthermore, a comprehensive framework structure for the PSM has been based on the 
business process model for PSM. The position of PSM elements can be defined by the more 
concrete activities for Plant-LCE. This makes it possible to specify how each PSM element 
should function in the PSM system. As a result, the proposed PSM framework can be applied 
to improvement of a company-specific PSM system to match a business’s configuration. 
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To ensure that the PSM business process described above is nothing less than disaster 
management for the process industry. 
5. Application of business process model as a reference model 
The business process model clarifies business flow in the form of PDCA cycle and the 
provision of resources within an IDEF0 format sheet. The hierarchies’ relationship between 
activities represents the superior and subordinate nature of activities. This can make 
explicitly how concrete activities at plant-site are directed by management and how the 
reporting of the results of activities generates suggestions for improvement to management. 
Business process model is used to drive logical and consistent business flow as a reference 
model. Two examples for actual analysis of problems are offered. 
5.1 Derivation of company-specific business flow 
The procedure to use the business process model at the plant-site consists of two steps: 
1. For a company-specific instance of the business process model, the business flow is 
rewritten by replacing the generic names of activities and information within the model 
with real-world activities undertaken in the company. 
2. Brainstorming compares the current activities with the business flow. This can expose 
the problems of management framework as well as those of the activities themselves. 
The business flow can be used to analyze various activities. From a safety viewpoint, two 
types of discussion are enabled: 
• Analysis of current activities, discussion of advanced countermeasures and 
precautionary action to prevent trouble/accidents, 
• Identification of root causes of trouble/accidents that have already occurred and 
discussion of countermeasures to prevent similar troubles/accidents. 
With regard to the first view-point, inexplicit problems can be found by comparing current 
activities with the specific business flow for the individual company. For example, problems 
such as “activity of planning is not specified”, “environment to share the process-safety information 
is not developed”, “expert workers who have adequate skill for performing the activities are not 
assigned”, can be clarified. Resulting safety countermeasures against them can be 
implemented preliminarily to prevent the troubles/accidents. With regard to the second 
view-point, root causes such as “problem on defect of information sharing”, “insufficient operator 
training and improper assignment of personnel” can be identified and safety countermeasures 
against them can be implemented to prevent the recurrences of trouble/accidents. 
Fig. 13 shows an analysis based on a specific business flow. Specifically, the following points 
can be seen on it. 
• Activities of PDCA cycle and resource provision are performed explicitly with the 
intents of follows; a) each role of activities of ‘Plan’, ‘Do’, ‘Check’, ‘Act’ is clarified and 
performed certainly as well as the management framework of PDCA cycle is there, and 
b) provision of resources and information needed to perform the activities of ‘Plan’, 
‘Do’, ‘Check’, ‘Act’ and management of engineering standard such as technical and 
management standards are performed. 
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• Contents of information transferring by performing activities such as the direction for 
planning and executing activities, the result of performing activities, including 
information on defect factors are sufficient. 
• Necessary resource, information, and engineering standard are provided in the 
referable form when needed from the ‘Provide resources’ activity. 
These ensure extraction of the problem on the contents of activity, the way information 
transfer ought to be, etc. 
 
Fig. 13. Activity analysis based on business flow 
5.2 Analysis for operation problems 
An example of the use of business process model for production from a safety point of view 
is application for operation problems in Fuji Oil Company, Ltd. It is well known that the root 
causes of operation failures due to human-error include misdirection, lack of 
communication and information sharing, poor education, lack of technical knowledge, and 
so on. Business process model for production is used to analyze these root causes of 
operation accidents that happened on the plant-site. 
Business process model is used to clarify the activities that comprise the PDCA cycle and the 
activities of resource provision. The generic identification of activities and information in the 
model for production were replaced by the actual activities undertaken in the Fuji Oil 
Company and other related ICOM was added to develop the specific business flow as an 
instance of the business process model. Fig. 14 shows a business flow for ‘Grade 3 LGO-
operation’. The following points have been examined to identify the root causes of operation 
problems and to consider the countermeasures to be used in planning for prevention or 
recurrence. 
• Each activity is performed according to engineering standards? 
• ICOM is transferred with certainty? 
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• Performance results of the ‘Manage (Act)’, ‘Plan’, and ‘Do’ activities are evaluated at 
’Check’ activity? 
• Workers are appropriately educated and/or trained? 
• Resources including personal assignment were provided sufficiently? 
• Other questions as shown in Fig. 13. 
As results of them, advantages using business process model for case example have been 
reported as follows. 
• Activities for safety management and/or quality management are not separated with 
usual manufacturing activities, but should be performed concurrently. 
• Developed specific business flow clarifies the activities for ‘Plan’, ‘Do’, ‘Check’, and ’Act’, 
and activity improvement based on it lead to implement certainly each activity which 
has been performed ambiguously in the past. 
• It is understandable that the ‘Provide resources’ activity is very important and can lead to 
develop the environment of information sharing. 
• Definition of activity based on the model can make the role of organization and human 
resources clear, and lead the integration or reformation of organization. 
These advantages lead to development of the environment of a logical PSM system, 
including a production support system, a maintenance system, and so on. 
 
Fig. 14. Case example – A business flow for ‘Grade 3 LGO operation’ 
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5.3 Analysis for maintenance problems 
The developed business process model for maintenance is an ideal model to maintain plant-
lifecycle safety. If the same mechanism as the model was used to perform maintenance, 
maintenance problems would not lead to accidents and/or disasters. Therefore, incidents 
related to maintenance would occur only if there were defects in the maintenance process. 
To uncover such defects, cases of malfunctions have been followed backward through the 
ideal business process model. 
The incident case to be followed here is: 
During shutdown maintenance of process plants, maintenance work for living H2S service line in 
offsite facility was planned. The block valve located at downstream of the control valve was to be 
inspected. The blind plate insertion place, operation for block valves and disposition for the control 
valve, which were responsible for operation section, were not correct. When the bolts for the block 
valve flange were released for inspection, H2S gas was released. Three workers were killed in this 
incident. 
Fig. 15 shows the overview of activities for maintenance. To trace the malfunction backward 
on the business process model, this overview was used. 
 
Fig. 15. Overview of activities for "maintenance" 
The incident occurred at inspection of the block valve, so that the analysis is started from 
A54332 activity of Node-A5433. The information within Node-A5433 is as shown in Fig. 16(a). 
A54332 was carried out on the constraint of the directive from A54331, so that ICOM (1)-1 
was incorrect directive. ICOM (8) included incorrect maintenance execution plan. A54331 
had responsibility for safe sub-directive (ICOM (1)-1), and the responsibility should have 
been clarified in engineering standard; i.e. ICOM (2)-3 and ICOM (9). A54335 could not 
deliver sufficient engineering standard, and A54331 did not inform change request of  
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(a) Summarized node-A5433. 
 
(b) Summarized node-A5432. 
 
(c) Summarized node-A543. 
A5421
Manage 
Maintenance 
Plan
A5422
Decide 
Maintenance 
Part and Time
A5423
Select Inspection 
and Repair 
Method
A5425
Provide  
Resources  for 
Maintenance 
Outline Planning
Node-A542
(26)-1 (27)-1
(28)-1
(29)-1
(30)
(31)
(32)(33) (34)
(26)-2 (27)-2(27)-3
(28)-2
(29)-2
 
(d) Summarized node-A542. 
 
(e) Summarized node-A54. 
 
(f) Summarized node-A5. 
Fig. 16. Analysis by tracing the business process model for maintenance problems 
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maintenance execution plan to A5436 (ICOM (7)). Therefore, the information described with 
heavy lines should have been incorrect, and the activities painted with gray (‘Manage’ and 
‘Provide resources’) should have had error. 
The Node-A5432 is almost same as Node-A5433 as shown in Fig. 16(b). The directive (ICOM 
(16)) from A5431 and the sub-directive ICOM-(10) from A54321 were incorrect. The ESs from 
A5435 (ICOM (17)) and from A54324 (ICOM-(11)-2) were incorrect. A54321 did not inform 
change request of maintenance execution plan to A5435 (ICOM (15)). The information 
described with heavy lines should have been incorrect, and the activities painted with gray 
(‘Manage’ and ‘Provide resources’) should have had error. 
As same as Node-A5432 and Node-A5433, directive (ICOM (24)), sub-directive (ICOM (17)-1, 
(17)-2), engineering standard (ICOM (25), (18)-3, (18)-1, (18)-2)), change request (ICOM (20)-
2, (21)) were incorrect. The change request (ICOM (23)) did not inform to the upper 
hierarchical node. Therefore, the information described with heavy lines should have been 
incorrect, and the activities painted with gray (‘Manage’ and ‘Provide resources’) should have 
had error as shown Fig. 16(c). 
These analyses are continued up to Node-A0, and the results are as shown in Figs. 16(d) to 
(f). The information described with heavy lines should have been incorrect, and the 
activities painted with gray (‘Manage’ and ‘Provide resources’) should have had error. 
This incident is categorized as problem of isolation, and is caused by the error in “A52 Make 
Production Plan” activity. However, it is obvious that it would be possible to prevent the 
incident, if the ‘Manage’ and ‘Provide resources’ activities are properly performed. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed a business process model of the Plant-LCE with the goal of creating 
an environment of logical disaster management. The importance of defining the business 
activities and information flow in the model as a reference model was described. The 
business process in the form of PDCA cycle throughout the plant-lifecycle as well as at each 
stage, and resource provision to share the process-safety information and to ensure 
consistency of engineering standard were also clarified. 
Business process models developed for design, production, maintenance, and PSM were 
summarized. These models systematically showed the universal activities and information 
flow at each engineering stage. A logical and consistent business flow for each company can 
be developed by referring to these models. A specific business flow shows the framework, 
activity, information, etc. that are needed in order to prevent malfunctions and accidents 
and it is useful for the development of an environment for a systematic PSM. As a result, the 
number of accidents and hazards due to these defect factors will be reduced. 
Further work is needed: 
• To consider the practicable business process model for ensuring consistency in 
engineering standard. 
• To consider the metrics for evaluating the result of activities at ‘Check’ stage. 
• To develop the framework of organization management based on the requirement of the 
framework of technical management which is represented in the business process model. 
• And cases studies should be undertaken to review and consider these issues. 
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